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The distinction between the positive and the negative is fundamental in our emotional
life. In appraisal theories, in particular in the component process model of emotion
(Scherer, 1984, 2010), qualitatively different types of valence are proposed based on
appraisals of (un)pleasantness, goal obstructiveness/conduciveness, low or high power,
self-(in)congruence, and moral badness/goodness. This multifaceted conceptualization of
valence is highly compatible with the frequent observation of mixed feelings in real life.
However, it seems to contradict the one-dimensional conceptualization of valence often
encountered in psychological theories, and the notion of valence as a common currency
used to explain choice behavior. Here, we propose a framework to integrate the seem-
ingly disparate conceptualizations of multifaceted valence and one-dimensional valence by
suggesting that valence should be conceived at different levels, micro and macro. Micro-
valences correspond to qualitatively different types of evaluations, potentially resulting
in mixed feelings, whereas one-dimensional macro-valence corresponds to an integrative
“common currency” to compare alternatives for choices. We propose that conceptualiz-
ing levels of valence may focus research attention on the mechanisms that relate valence
at one level (micro) to valence at another level (macro), leading to new hypotheses, and
addressing various concerns that have been raised about the valence concept, such as the
valence-emotion relation.
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Valence is “one of the most important scientific concepts at the
heart of emotion experience” (Charland, 2005, p. 83). An impor-
tant question, then, is “what is valence?” The term valence was
introduced by Lewin (1951) who used it in his field theory to
refer to the forces that attract individuals to desirable objects and
repel them from undesirable ones. The concept has since been
considerably extended, including, but not limited to, the designa-
tion of emotions as positively or negatively valenced (for reviews,
e.g., Solomon and Stone, 2002; Colombetti, 2005). There is strong
agreement that valence, expressed with terms such as positive-
negative, good-bad, or pleasure-displeasure, captures something
essential about affect (Ortony et al., 1990; Solomon and Stone,
2002; Russell, 2003; Charland, 2005; Colombetti, 2005; Barrett,
2006; Frijda and Scherer, 2009). Researchers from various disci-
plines interested in emotions but also in motivation, learning, and
decision making refer to the distinction between the positive and
the negative with terms such as valence, pleasantness, utility, or
liking/wanting.
The importance of the valence concept is also evident in
appraisal theories, where pleasantness and goal conduciveness
appraisal criteria have traditionally been seen as valence judgments
(e.g., Frijda et al., 1989). Scherer (2010) recently suggested that
other appraisal criteria in his component process model (CPM)
are also valenced, such as power, self-congruence, and moral good-
ness. In the first part of the current paper, we describe these
types of valence in more detail. The resulting multifaceted view of
valence based on an appraisal framework is useful to predict and
describe mixed feelings, and, in conjunction with other appraisals,
to predict and describe emotions and action tendencies.
However, as will be discussed in the second part of the paper, the
multifaceted conceptualization of different types of valence con-
trasts with the widely accepted view of valence as one-dimensional.
For example, researchers note the need for a common currency
in order to make choices (e.g., call mother or do laundry?),
and valence has repeatedly been proposed to serve this pur-
pose (e.g., McFarland and Sibly, 1975; McNamara and Hous-
ton, 1986; Cabanac, 1992; Shizgal and Conover, 1996; Montague
and Berns, 2002; Peters et al., 2006; Pfister and Böhm, 2008).
Although appraisal and one-dimensional valence “represent two
major approaches to understand emotional experience in contem-
porary emotion research . . . [they] have largely lived side by side”
(Kuppens et al., 2012, p. 1). Researchers have only very recently
begun to examine the dynamic interplay between them in everyday
experience (Kuppens et al., 2012).
In the third part of the paper, we propose a novel framework
that may integrate the multifaceted with a one-dimensional view of
valence by suggesting that valence should be conceived at different
levels, micro and macro. Multifaceted micro-valences correspond
to qualitatively different types of evaluations, potentially result-
ing in mixed feelings, whereas one-dimensional macro-valence
corresponds to an integrative summary that informs choice. Con-
ceptualizing levels of valence may focus research attention on the
mechanisms that relate valence at one level (micro) to valence at
another level (macro), leading to new hypotheses. We also discuss
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how our framework complements related models, such as the
evaluative space model (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994).
MULTIFACETED VALENCE
Appraisal theory favors a multifaceted view of valence, proposing
that emotions emerge as a consequence of events being appraised
on multiple criteria. An appraisal consists of a subjective evalua-
tion of (real, recalled, or fictitious) events or situations. Appraisals
can be processed consciously or unconsciously by different cog-
nitive systems (Leventhal and Scherer, 1987). The CPM (Scherer,
1984, 2001, 2009, 2010) proposes several appraisal criteria that
are used to determine an event’s relevance and implications, the
individual’s coping potential in the situation, and the normative
significance of the event. Specifically, an individual can evaluate the
relevance of an event by appraising its novelty, pleasantness, and
goal relevance. Implications of an event are appraised with evalua-
tions of causal attribution, outcome probability, discrepancy from
expectations, goal/need conduciveness, and urgency. The individ-
ual’s coping potential depends on the general controllability of
an event, the individual’s power to influence a situation, and the
individual’s possibilities of adjusting to the situation. Informa-
tion about the normative significance of an event is determined
by comparisons to internal and external standards. The appraisals
may be processed in a specific sequence (Scherer, 2001, 2009).
For example, pleasantness is processed before goal conduciveness
(e.g., Grandjean and Scherer, 2008). The assumption of recur-
sive sequences of appraisals is particular to the CPM, but many
of the proposed appraisal criteria are similarly described in other
appraisal theories (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003).
Of the different appraisals, pleasantness and goal conducive-
ness have traditionally been perceived as valenced (e.g., Frijda
et al., 1989). Scherer (2010) recently proposed that the outcomes
of additional appraisals can also be regarded as different types of
valence. Here, we describe in much greater detail than has been
done in previous CPM papers how the outcomes of five appraisals
may be valenced: pleasantness/beauty, goal conduciveness, power,
compatibility with the self (self-congruence), and compatibility
with norms (moral goodness). We do not include all appraisal
criteria, because our aim here is to illustrate the general point of
multifaceted valence. Future research may extend the framework
to include other appraisal criteria (e.g., novelty, certainty).
As a first type of valence, an evaluation can refer to pleas-
antness and beauty appraisal, related to the sensual or hedonic
experience of a situation (Voss et al., 2003). Freud (1920) even
argued that “our entire psychical activity is bent upon procuring
pleasure and avoiding pain” (p. 311, italics removed). A common
example for pleasurable experiences is eating good food, “one of
life’s greatest pleasures” (Drewnowski, 1997, p. 243). In any situa-
tion, conflicting pleasantness appraisals are possible. For example,
wearing high heels may feel painful but look pretty to a woman
(Phelan, 2002). Thus, at any point in time, an experience can be
both more or less unpleasant and more or less pleasant, in line with
univariate notions of valence (e.g., Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994).
Current homeostatic needs and basic physiological reactions may
change temporary boundary settings for pleasantness experiences
(e.g., Cabanac, 1979). For example, cool water may be unpleas-
ant when one is cold and refreshing when one is hot (Cabanac,
1979). In contrast, an example for innate and less variable pleas-
antness is the pleasure derived from sweet tastes that shows high
heritability and leads to similar reactions across species (Steiner
et al., 2001; Keskitalo et al., 2007). A strong, genetically deter-
mined association of particular objects with (dis)pleasure is called
intrinsic (un)pleasantness. Evolution may cause a certain level of
invariability for the (un)pleasantness of things that are inherently
harmful or beneficial for survival. In the case of sweetness prefer-
ence, sugar preference may have evolved because sugar is an easily
detectable, though rough, indicator for eatable foods (Ramirez,
1990). Although intrinsic pleasantness may be rooted in ultimate
evolutionary benefits, it can be differentiated from proximal goal
conduciveness.
Goal conduciveness is a second, qualitatively different, type of
valence. The determinant of goal conduciveness is the function-
ality or efficiency of a situation to satisfy needs, achieve goals,
or confirm values. The role of homeostatic needs differs for goal
conduciveness and pleasantness. The degree of goal conduciveness
is directly determined by the degree of need satisfaction or goal
attainment. In contrast, needs may set thresholds for pleasant-
ness, but cannot predict pleasantness beyond those thresholds. An
event can satisfy goal attainment directly or by facilitating further
goal-directed behavior. For example, food may be more or less con-
ducive to health or appearance goals, and thus be at the same time
goal conduciveness in one regard and goal obstructive in another
regard (e.g., Lindeman and Stark, 1999; Cramer and Antonides,
2011), consistent with univariate notions valence (e.g., Cacioppo
and Berntson, 1994). Pleasure and goal conduciveness often co-
occur. For example, in natural reward learning, pleasure experi-
ences may trigger the learning of stimulus- or behavior-reward
associations, followed by the attribution of goal conduciveness
to the newly associated instrumental stimulus or behavior (e.g.,
Berridge and Valenstein, 1991). However, empirical research shows
that pleasure is independent of goal conduciveness. The sensual
enjoyment of an object and the goal striving toward an object rely
on different brain mechanisms (e.g., Berridge, 2003). Also, hedo-
nic and utilitarian dimensions can be empirically distinguished
as independent variables in consumer attitudes (e.g., Voss et al.,
2003). The dissociation between the positive valence associated
with each goal achievement and pleasantness can lead to the para-
doxical effect that individuals strive harder to acquire consumer
goods they like less (e.g., Litt et al., 2010). Finally, the distinction
of pleasantness and goal conduciveness is also evident with regard
to sugar preference. Evolved sugar preference can be attributed to
pleasantness rather than goal conduciveness appraisals, because
sweetness can elicit positive affect, even if the sweet drink is con-
sidered too sweet for consumption (Booth et al., 2010). Moreover,
sugar is not a particularly sensitive indicator for the nutritive value
of a food (Ramirez, 1990). In addition to the evolved tendency of
being evaluated positively, sugar may, particularly in more devel-
oped countries, be appraised as goal obstructive to health and
appearance goals.
Third, the outcome of a power appraisal is valenced. Power
appraisals refer to the ability of an individual to have influence
by one’s own actions or by mobilizing others (Scherer, 1984,
2009). High power is associated with positive affect and low power
with negative affect (e.g., Keltner et al., 2003). Because of the
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importance of personal influence, the role of resources differs for
power and goal conduciveness. Power is tightly linked to personal
control over resources. In contrast, goals may also be achieved with
resources outside one’s personal control. For example, my goal to
live in personal safety is to a large extent achieved by means that are
outside my personal control, for example, by police and laws. In
the CPM, power appraisals only matter when an event is appraised
as generally controllable by humans, animals, or human artifacts
(Scherer, 1984, 2009). For example, one may perceive running a
marathon after 4 months of training as generally feasible. Once
the event is appraised as controllable, personal failure in running a
marathon may result in feeling powerless. The importance of con-
trollability appraisals for power suggests a coping strategy when
feeling powerless. Once the event is appraised as uncontrollable
(e.g., nobody could run a marathon after only 4 months of train-
ing), feelings of power are no longer threatened. A related concept
to power appraisals is self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1977). These
beliefs about personal ability to influence a particular situation
may initiate and sustain coping behavior, increasing the likelihood
of experiencing positively valenced feelings of power.
The fourth type of valence is based on appraising an event as
congruent with one’s self-concept. Individuals generally like con-
gruence, balance, and harmony, and these can also be applied to the
self. According to Higgins (1987), there are several self-domains.
The “actual self” refers to how a person perceives him- or herself
to actually be, the “ought self” to what the self should be like based
on norms or duties, and the “ideal self” to what the person aspires
to be. These domains can be based on one’s own or another’s
standpoint. Previous CPM work (Scherer, 1984, 2009) emphasized
the distinction between internal and external norms, but here we
refer to the actual self and the ought/ideal self to characterize
self-congruence and moral goodness, respectively. For example,
food choices may reflect one’s identity and result in feeling self-
congruent (Lindeman and Stark, 1999). The self includes traits,
internalized roles, and social identities. Self-congruence is there-
fore applicable to conceptualizations of the independent or inter-
dependent self (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). The importance of
self-congruence is captured in multiple psychological concepts,
such as cognitive dissonance (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959), self-
affirmation (Steele and Liu, 1983), and self-verification (Swann
and Read, 1981). Trait self-congruence is positively associated with
self-esteem, life satisfaction, and positive affect (Goldman and Ker-
nis, 2002). In contrast, conflicting internalized roles may result in
feelings of incongruence. For example, individuals may have con-
flicting gender and work identities (Sacharin et al., 2009); wearing
a purse may be in accordance with a female field engineer’s gender
identity and at the same time not be in accordance with her work
identity (Miller, 2004).
A fifth type of valence, based on appraisal of an event as being
in accord with one’s ought and ideal self, is moral goodness. Duties
and ideals are defined in a social context and can be more or less
internalized. For example, there are multiple ideals and duties for
members of a religion. Even food may be the object of moral
goodness: it may be offered to the gods to assure their goodwill
(Appadurai, 1981). Other duties and ideals extend the social group
to all humanity (e.g., categorical imperative). Typically, moral
goodness ensures group cohesion and helps to satisfy the need
to belong (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). However, ideals may also
be construed in opposition to a common moral code (e.g., anar-
chists). In this paper, we do not distinguish sharply between moral
and conventional rules. In the moral domain (e.g., “you shall not
kill”), evaluations may occur in an all-or-nothing fashion: good or
bad, right or wrong; in the domain of conventions (what dress to
wear to a wedding), appraisal results may be more graded. For both
domains, feelings are essential in learning and maintaining how
to “be good.” At any moment in time, an experience can contain
both morally good and bad elements, consistent with a univariate
notion of valence (e.g., Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994). For exam-
ple, images of charity work contain morally bad elements (e.g.,
injustice reflected in poverty) and morally good elements (help-
ing behavior). Research on self-conscious affect suggests that the
appraisals of self-congruency and moral goodness may often occur
slower than other appraisals, such as pleasantness, and be more
deliberate; however, they can also become internalized resulting in
fast and unconscious processing (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 1999).
The multifaceted view on valence of the CPM is highly com-
patible with the notion of mixed feelings. The CPM suggests three
different routes to mixed positive and negative affect. First, there
may be conflicts within an appraisal, for example when an image
of charity work contains features that lead to appraisals of moral
goodness and of moral badness. Second, different appraisals may
conflict. For example, pleasure and goal conduciveness can be in
conflict when sugary foods taste good to person on a diet, result-
ing in feeling good and bad at the same time. Third, conflicts can
arise between systems of processing of an appraisal. For exam-
ple, the association between goal conduciveness and a stimulus
can be implicitly learned (schematic level) or can be learned from
rules (conceptual level), and these processing systems can con-
flict (Leventhal and Scherer, 1987; Van Reekum and Scherer, 1997;
compare also Rangel et al., 2008). Indeed, evidence is accumulat-
ing that individuals can simultaneously feel positive and negative
affect (e.g., Diener and Iran-Nejad, 1986; Scherer and Ceschi, 1997;
Larsen et al., 2001; Schimmack, 2001, 2005; Scherer et al., 2004;
Oceja and Carrera, 2009; Larsen and McGraw, 2011).
Furthermore, the CPM suggests how multifaceted valence may
be related to specific behavioral tendencies based on the multi-
componential view of emotions. The components are appraisals,
subjective feelings, physiological changes, motor expressions, and
action tendencies. Appraisals are regarded as driving changes in
the other emotion components leading to full-blown emotions
when the different components are synchronized (Scherer, 2009).
Appraisal theory specifies appraisal profiles for different emotions
(e.g., Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Roseman et al., 1990; Smith et al.,
1993; Scherer, 1997; Kuppens et al., 2007; Siemer et al., 2007; Tong
et al., 2009). For example, the combination of unpleasantness
and moral badness of the situation, in conjunction with other
appraisals, has been associated with anger, and the combination of
unpleasantness of the situation and low power of the individual
with sadness (e.g., Scherer, 1997). No one appraisal may be neces-
sary or sufficient for an emotion, but the occurrence of an emotion
may require a subset of the proposed appraisals in appraisal theory
(Kuppens et al., 2003; Parkinson and Roper, 2009). The inte-
gration of appraisals may not only depend on which appraisals
are combined, but also on the nature of the appraised situation.
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Specifically, Ortony et al. (1990) describe how particular appraisals
regarding events, objects, or actions and concerning the self or oth-
ers are associated with emotions. Even more elaborate integration
functions for the appraisal-emotion relation have recently been
proposed. On the basis of Anderson’s (1989) model of integra-
tion functions Scherer (2004) suggests that the type of integration
rule for the combinations of appraisal criteria may depend on an
individual’s current goals. For example, coping ability is of less
relevance when things are going according to plan. In Anderson’s
approach, this would be modeled by a configuration rule in which
the importance of one criterion depends on the level of another.
Non-linear dynamic system analysis is a more appropriate frame-
work for emotion modeling of such integration functions than is
the classic assumption of linear functions (Scherer, 2000).
Commonly, appraisals are linked to action tendencies via emo-
tions. For example, sadness is associated with the action tendency
of helplessness and anger with antagonistic behavior (Frijda et al.,
1989). Studying more directly the relations between emotion com-
ponents, appraisal theorists showed that appraisals are associated
with specific action tendencies (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989). Efferent
effects occur in the autonomic nervous system (e.g., in the form of
cardiovascular and respiratory changes) and in the somatic ner-
vous system (in the form of motor expression in face, voice, and
body; e.g., Van Reekum et al., 2004).
To a limited extent, it is also possible to predict choice from
appraisals given the existing theoretical development of appraisal
theory. For example, appraisals of high and low control may
inform the choice between a high- and low-risk option (Lerner
and Keltner, 2000). However, without further extending appraisal
theory, it is not possible to predict choice more generally. For
example, how does a person choose between a pleasant but goal-
obstructive option (e.g., reading Facebook at work) and one that
is unpleasant but goal conducive (e.g., proofreading an article)?
Appraisal theory was not developed to answer these questions, or
to predict choice behavior more generally, but here we suggest that
it can be further developed to that end.
To summarize, four strengths of a multifaceted valence con-
cept based on appraisal theory have been discussed (there may be
more): (a) qualitative differences between events can be described
(e.g., pleasant versus goal conducive events); (b) appraisal the-
ory can explain mixed feelings; (c) mechanisms are proposed
for how valences combine to form emotions; and (d) combina-
tions of valences can be used to predict specific action tenden-
cies. Appraisal theory requires further development before choice
across situations can be explained. We propose in this paper that
an integration of the multifaceted view of valence with a one-
dimensional view of valence may be useful to solve this problem.
In the following, we discuss the advantages and ubiquity of a one-
dimensional valence concept. We also briefly review the problems
associated with one-dimensional valence.
ONE-DIMENSIONAL VALENCE
The one-dimensional valence concept may be the key to under-
standing how behavior is prioritized (e.g., Cabanac, 1992). There
is a logical need for the integration of complex affective expe-
riences into a common currency to compare, rank, and choose
between options (e.g., McFarland and Sibly, 1975; McNamara and
Houston, 1986; Cabanac, 1992; Shizgal and Conover, 1996; Mon-
tague and Berns, 2002; Pfister and Böhm, 2008). It has repeatedly
been proposed that valence may function as that common cur-
rency (e.g., Cabanac, 1992; Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006; Peters et al.,
2006). Valence is here closely related to the notion of utility, which
similarly captures total satisfaction with a good or service and
influences preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shizgal and
Conover, 1996; Kahneman et al., 1997; Montague and Berns, 2002;
Russell, 2003).
Cabanac and colleagues showed in multiple experiments that
valence may function as a common currency (for a review, see
Cabanac, 1992). For example, participants walked on a treadmill
and rated the discomfort in their chest and in their legs. In a
different session, participants could adjust the speed of the tread-
mill at various slopes or vice versa. Participants’ choices reflected
the algebraic sum of their previous discomfort ratings (Cabanac,
1985). In a different study, the duration of enduring a painful
position could be modeled as the algebraic sum of subjective pain
and money reward (Cabanac, 1986). In another study, after partici-
pants rated the pleasantness of sandwiches, they could then choose
what to have for lunch by paying money for sandwiches they liked
or by receiving money for sandwiches they disliked in various ses-
sions with different payment structures. The chosen sandwiches
reflected the area of optimal compromise between pleasure and
cost (Cabanac, 1995). Other research, too, supports the notion of
a common currency. For example, individuals consider the pleas-
antness of an anticipated emotion as well as its usefulness, and
may even choose situations that arouse unpleasant emotions if
they believe that these emotions are goal conducive (Tamir, 2009).
Given its importance for choice, it is not surprising that valence
is evident early in ontogenetic development. For example, it has
been suggested that signs of distress can already be differentiated
from general arousal in 3-week-old infants (Bridges, 1932). Under-
lying the expression of negative affect is presumably the ability to
appraise events as positive or negative. Furthermore, sweet and
bitter tastes arouse homologous behavioral patterns in newborns
and in non-human primates (Steiner et al., 2001). As indicated by
studies on (un)pleasant and goal conducive (obstructive) events,
many of the neural correlates for valence seem to be shared with
other mammalian species (e.g., Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008).
This suggests that positive and negative valence is an evolutionary
old distinction.
Furthermore, valence emerges repeatedly as the dimension that
explains most variance in the classifications of affective words,
facial and vocal expressions, and affective states aroused by var-
ious stimuli across language and age groups; other dimensions
that characterize the affective space are arousal, dominance, and
novelty (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2007, in press). Across language and
age groups and in patients and non-patients, analyses of emotion
words used to describe affective states repeatedly show a valence
dimension as the underlying organizational structure with the
greatest explanatory power (e.g., Block, 1957; Bush, 1973; Russell
and Mehrabian, 1977; Russell, 1978, 1980; Russell and Ridgeway,
1983; Russell et al., 1989; Reisenzein, 1994; Feldman, 1995; Kring
et al., 2003). In addition, facial expressions can be structured along
a valence dimension (e.g., Schlosberg, 1954; Abelson and Sermat,
1962; Russell and Bullock, 1985; Russell et al., 1989). Valence also
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explains the most variance regarding the underlying structure of
subjective judgments of affective vocal stimuli (e.g., Green and
Cliff, 1975). Furthermore, self-reported affective states in everyday
life and in response to hypothetical scenarios, affective pictures,
and colors can be organized along a valence dimension (e.g., Rus-
sell and Mehrabian, 1977; Russell and Steiger, 1982; Bradley and
Lang, 1994; Valdez and Mehrabian, 1994; Feldman, 1995; Barrett,
1996; Barrett and Russell, 1998; Yik et al., 1999). Similarly, when
taking multiple components of the affective experience jointly into
account, the valence dimension captures most of the variance
in the data, as shown in cross-cultural studies on the underly-
ing structure of appraisals, psychophysiological changes, motor
expressions, action tendencies, subjective experiences, and emo-
tion regulation (Fontaine et al., 2007, in press). The reliability with
which a valence dimension appears in these studies suggests that
valence is always present in human affective life (Russell, 2003).
A strong case can be made for the necessity and existence of one-
dimensional valence. Not surprisingly, one-dimensional valence
plays a central role in current emotion theories, such as theo-
ries of core affect and the psychological construction of emotion
in which valence constitutes, together with arousal, core affect
(Russell, 2003; Barrett, 2006).
However, there are also several problems with a one-
dimensional valence concept. First, the role of a single valence
dimension for behavior prediction is limited. Although positive
affect has been associated with a generative behavioral orienta-
tion (exploring, achieving positive outcomes, risk taking, little
loss aversion) and negative affect with a defensive behavioral ori-
entation (avoiding negative outcomes; Seo et al., 2010), other
researchers suggest that approach and withdrawal may be related
only to particular positive and negative emotions (Davidson,
1994). Importantly, emotions that cannot be distinguished based
on their valence, such as fear and anger (Scherer, 2005), may influ-
ence cognition and behavior in different ways (e.g., Zeelenberg and
Pieters, 2006). For example, anger reduces the perception of risk,
but fear increases it (Lerner and Keltner, 2000). Also, anger has
been associated with approach behavior, but fear with avoidance
behavior (e.g., Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009).
Second, a one-dimensional valence concept is at odds with
research findings on mixed feelings. Evidence is accumulating that
individuals feel mixed emotions at the same time (e.g., Diener and
Iran-Nejad, 1986; Scherer and Ceschi, 1997; Larsen et al., 2001;
Schimmack, 2001, 2005; Scherer et al., 2004; Oceja and Carrera,
2009). Given the limitations in the temporal resolution of the
measurement of affect, the existence of true mixed emotions has
been questioned, with some arguing that positive and negative
emotions vacillate rather than co-occur (e.g., Barrett and Bliss-
Moreau, 2009). However, increasingly sophisticated measurement
techniques suggest that mixed emotions do exist (e.g., Larsen and
McGraw, 2011).
Third, the assignment of emotions to valence is, upon closer
inspection, ambiguous (Solomon and Stone, 2002; Charland,
2005; Colombetti, 2005; Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2006; Pfister and
Böhm, 2008; Frijda, 2009). For example, theoretically a situation
causing anger may be experienced as negative, but the arousal asso-
ciated with being angry experienced as positive (e.g., Pfister and
Böhm, 2008). The theoretically derived ambiguity of emotions like
anger contrasts with the common empirical finding that anger is a
negative emotion from studies on the structure of affect reviewed
above as well as from studies with a direct assessments of the per-
ceived valence of anger (e.g., Bänziger et al., 2005). This poses an
unresolved puzzle that will be discussed in a later section of this
paper.
Fourth, using a one-dimensional valence concept to charac-
terize an emotion (e.g., fear is negative) leads to conflation in
the causes, feelings, consequences, and other aspects associated
with the emotion as negative (Colombetti, 2005), which may in
many cases not be justified (e.g., fear has the positive consequence
of avoiding danger; Colombetti, 2005). Similarly, shame may
feel negatively, but the effect it has on encouraging normatively
appropriate behavior can be regarded as a positive consequence.
The problem is that the descriptive finding from one domain
(e.g., fear/shame feels bad) may lead to prescriptive judgments
(fear/shame is a negative emotion) and unjustified implications
(fear/shame is to be avoided).
Finally, using a one-dimensional valence concept ranging from
pleasant to unpleasant may foster dichotomous thinking (good
versus bad, positive versus negative), implying that “less positive”
means “more negative,” which is not necessarily true (Colombetti,
2005). For example, positive or negative attitudes have distin-
guishable causes and consequences (e.g., Cacioppo and Berntson,
1994).
To summarize, we have discussed three major strengths of
the one-dimensional valence concept (we do not rule out that
there may be more strengths): (a) one-dimensional valence cor-
responds to the empirically emerging structure of affective life;
(b) one-dimensional valence is necessary for choice; and (c) the
distinction of positive and negative may be evolutionary old. The
weaknesses of a one-dimensional valence concept are that (a) it is
difficult to predict action tendencies beyond a general generative
or defensive orientation from valence; (b) mixed felt affect cannot
be explained; (c) associating emotions with valence is ambigu-
ous; (d) the concept may lead to unjustified conflations; and (e)
the concept may lead to dichotomous thinking. Given these prob-
lems, some researchers have even come to the conclusion that “the
analysis of emotions in terms of ‘valence’ . . . is an idea that we
should abandon and leave behind” (Solomon and Stone, 2002, pp.
431–432; Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2006).
A FRAMEWORK FOR LEVELS OF VALENCE
How can the idea that qualitatively different types of valence exist
be reconciled with the proposition that valence can serve as a
common currency for choice? Which of the perspectives should be
preferred, given that they both have advantages and disadvantages?
Instead of believing that only either qualitatively different types of
valence or a “common currency” valence exists, we suggest that
both views can be reconciled by assuming that valence can exist at
two levels. We propose a new theoretical framework that bridges
the opposing notions of valence. We suggest that valence is located,
first, at the level of individual appraisal outcomes (micro-valence)
and second, at the level of an integration of various inputs, which
may or may not include micro-valences, into a macro-valence.
Importantly, in addition to suggesting that micro-valences and
macro-valence occur (e.g., compare Cabanac, 1992), we propose
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specific mechanisms for the nature of the relation between micro-
and macro-valence.
Figure 1 shows a schematic overview of the proposed the-
oretical framework. It entails multifaceted micro-valences, one-
dimensional macro-valence, and affect categories. When interact-
ing with the environment (for example, when browsing Facebook
at work), an individual (e.g., Alex) evaluates a situation by using
different appraisal criteria. For example, Alex may be able to eval-
uate the pleasantness of the situation, how goal conducive it is,
how much control he or she has, how well the situation agrees
with the self-concept, and how normatively appropriate the situ-
ation is. Although Alex may have a large repertoire of appraisal
criteria at his or her disposal, some criteria may be more salient,
or in the foreground, than others. For example, Alex may think
mostly about the pleasantness, how well the situation serves the
goals of maintaining a social network and getting work done, and
the event’s normative significance. Alex may then come to a num-
ber of appraisal results, that is, micro-valences (e.g., the situation is
fun, good for the goal of maintaining a social network but bad for
getting work done, and morally bad). Thus, the overall experience
may be multifaceted and lead to conflicting feelings.
It may be important to compare the situation to a different
situation, for example, when deciding among behavioral options
for the next day (Facebook? work?). For choice among behavioral
alternatives (i.e., in order to make a decision), even though there
may be negative and positive aspects of each alternative, there
needs to be a net outcome of bipolar macro-valence (e.g., feeling
“good” about reading Facebook and “somewhat bad” about doing
work, and thus choosing to read Facebook).
Furthermore,Alex may want to express how he or she feels when
talking to a friend. Humans semantically categorize their affective
states and communicate them to others (e.g., Rimé, 2009). The
expression can take multiple socially agreed upon forms, such
as facial expressions, gestures, postures, tones of voice, words,
and music. With words, combinations of micro-valences can be
expressed in prototypical emotion terms (e.g., anger, happiness) or
mixed emotion terms (e.g., nostalgia, Schadenfreude), figurative
expressions, or more lengthy explanations (Scherer and Ceschi,
1997; Scherer et al., 2004). For example, Alex may use emotion
terms and say he or she feels happy when reading Facebook, but
bored when doing work. These emotion terms capture valenced
and non-valenced appraisals and additional emotion components,
such as physiological changes and action tendencies. Rather than
using emotion terms, Alex may use a metaphor and say he or
she feels blue when doing work. Another alternative is to say that
he or she feels very good about reading Facebook and somewhat
bad about working, or, even more succinctly, that he or she feels
good overall about reading Facebook at work. For communicat-
ing one’s state, positive and negative may be construed as bipolar
or as bivariate. The categories used to express one’s feelings to
FIGURE 1 |The different functions of micro-valences, macro-valence,
and affect categories. Various micro-valences (individual evaluations,
positive and negative dimensions), macro-valence (an overall affect
ranging from negative to positive), and affect categorization co-occur in
time. Micro-valences and macro-valence influence behavior,
macro-valence is necessary for choice, and affect categories are used in
communication. Displayed are the appraisal-based micro-valences
discussed in the paper, but other micro-valences are possible. The figure
displays some components of emotions (some appraisals in
micro-valences, action tendencies in behavior, and expression in
communication), but not all (e.g., other appraisals, physiological changes,
and subjective feeling, e.g., Scherer, 2009).
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others may be highly dependent on current cultural norms and
rather fuzzy. When communicating an affective experience, some
information may get lost. Additionally, meanings that were not
part of the affective experience may be added by the perceiver.
The less-than-perfect match between experience, expression, and
perception is a general problem of communication that affects all
forms of communication.
The above example may suggest that micro-valences occur
before macro-valence, but as illustrated in Figure 2 and described
further below in the current framework micro-valences, macro-
valence, and emotions are modeled with no strict primacy in
time of one component over the others. Instead, multiple pos-
sible pathways across time are specified, including micro-valences
that precede macro-valence and macro-valence that precedes the
integration of micro-valences to emotions. The framework is
therefore highly compatible with the notion that affective expe-
riences are not “static phases, but . . . dynamic phenomena of
which the components continuously change and follow each other
across time (Kuppens et al., 2012, p. 7). Researchers can aim at
describing, explaining, and predicting one part of this dynamic
(e.g., how macro-valence follows from an integration of previous
micro-valences) or another (e.g., how macro-valences influence
subsequent micro-valences).
We suggest that macro-valence is always present, need not have
an object, and may have multiple causes ranging from psycho-
logical to physiological. Although macro-valence is justified by its
utility in a choice situation and then obviously has an object, we
suggest that macro-valence is also present in non-choice situations
and may be without a particular object, such as in the case of a
mood that is typically defined as having no object. With regard to
these features, macro-valence is similar to “core affect” valence in
psychological constructionist models of emotion (Russell, 2003;
Barrett, 2006). In contrast, micro-valences have an object, not all
appraisals may be available at birth (e.g., moral goodness), and
they may differ in salience; as a result, not all micro-valences may
be present at every moment in time. However, the subset com-
prising relevance appraisals, including pleasantness appraisals, is
likely to be continuously processed. Processing of micro- and
macro-valences and affect categories may occur consciously or
unconsciously (e.g., Van Reekum and Scherer, 1997).
FIGURE 2 | Macro-valence, micro-valence, and affect categories over
time. Macro-valence, micro-valence, and affect categories co-occur in
time, and influence subsequent macro-valence, micro-valence, and affect
categories as indicated by the arrows. The numbers (1–6) correspond to
the Sections “From Micro-Valences at Time t to Macro-Valence at Time
t +1,” “From Macro-Valence at Time t to Micro-Valence at Time t +1,”
“From Micro-Valence at Time t to Micro-Valence at Time t +1,” “From
Macro-Valence at Time t to Macro-Valence at Time t +1,” From
Micro-Valence at Time t to Emotions at Time t +1,” and “Macro-Valence
at Time t Moderates the Paths from Micro-Valence at Time t to Emotions
and Macro-Valence at Time t +1” in the paper where the paths are
discussed.
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Furthermore, although some researchers have described
valence as “hot” and contrasted it with “cold” judgments, such as
appraisals (Russell, 2003), we do not make this distinction. Valence
is not restricted to emotions, but is also relevant for attitudes and
preferences (Cacioppo et al., 1999). Similar processes may relate
multifaceted micro-valences with one-dimensional macro-valence
in “hot” and “cold” judgments.
Most important, we propose that the relations between micro-
and macro-valence and affect categories deserve more attention
in the research agenda of affective scientists. We discuss existing
evidence and propose new hypotheses for the paths displayed in
Figure 2, and also justify the absence of certain paths. We then
discuss the implications of the framework for mixed feelings and
choice situations.
FROMMICRO-VALENCES AT TIME T TO MACRO-VALENCE AT TIME
T + 1
In a recent study on affective experience in daily life, Kuppens
et al. (2012) examined whether appraisals at time t predict valence
at time t + 1. They found that motivational congruence, coping
potential, and future expectancy appraisals predicted more general
feelings of valence [operationalized as feeling (un)pleasant]. Kup-
pens et al. did not use the CPM appraisal checks but were oriented
by the framework of Smith et al. (1993); nonetheless, their results
are highly relevant for the current paper, because their research
demonstrates, for the first time, the influence of appraisals on
valence in everyday experiences. Furthermore, the authors found
large variance across persons in the appraisal-valence relation, sug-
gesting that the influence of appraisals on valence differs across
individuals.
To better understand how such individual differences may come
about, and to predict in more detail how micro-valences may
influence macro-valence, multiple hypotheses for the underlying
integration function can be derived in particular from behavioral
economic models and animal behavior models on choice. These
models describe how attributes are integrated to inform choice
normatively (how is the objectively best choice achieved?) or by
observing decision making with hypothetical scenarios. Addition-
ally, the processes that underlie inferences in decision making
may be similar to the processes that underlie preferences (e.g.,
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). Taken together, this research
suggests several processes for the integration of micro-valences
to macro-valence. A common distinction is between processes in
which all available information is taken into account versus those
in which some information is ignored.
First, micro-valences may be integrated to macro-valence by
a weighted sum (e.g., Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Hammond et al.,
1998; Mellers, 2000). For each alternative (e.g., a situation or an
object), the macro-valence across its appraisals is computed before
the alternative is compared to other alternatives. Furthermore,
with dynamic models (e.g., McNamara and Houston, 1986), the
integration of evaluations is dependent on the previous state of the
system. It remains to be tested whether the integration of micro-
valences at time t to macro-valence at time t + 1 depends on the
state of the micro-valences at time t − 1. Without this effect, one’s
overall feeling, for example, when taking a warm shower would
be influenced only by the current temperature of the water. With
a dynamic model, the previous water temperature would also be
important.
Second, instead of using a decision function that requires the
extensive processing of all micro-valences in a situation, choices
can be simplified by (a) taking all micro-valences into account with
equal weights (so-called tallying or Dawes’ rule; e.g., Gigerenzer
and Gaissmaier, 2011), (b) by focusing on a limited number
of micro-valences (e.g., in a lexicographic or a elimination-by-
aspect strategy, see below), or (c) by only taking one micro-valence
into account (so-called one-clever-cue heuristic; Gigerenzer and
Gaissmaier, 2011). More specifically, a lexicographic decision rule
refers to the strategy where alternatives are successively selected
on the basis of the best option regarding the most important
micro-valence(s). With an elimination-by-aspect strategy (Tver-
sky, 1972), alternatives are successively eliminated that do not
meet a minimum level for the important micro-valence(s). For
example, when deciding among several options, an individual may
follow an elimination-by-aspect strategy and find moral goodness
more important than pleasantness. She may choose to eliminate
all options that do not meet a minimum level of moral goodness
followed by eliminating all remaining options that do not meet a
minimum level of pleasantness. The individual may subsequently
use a lexicographic decision rule and select all options that have
the highest level of goal conduciveness followed by choosing the
option with the highest level of self-congruency. In both strate-
gies, no trade-offs between micro-valences are required (Luce
et al., 1997). In other words, the individual would not need to
compare how much moral goodness corresponds to how much
pleasantness.
What determines which process individuals use to integrate
micro-valences to macro-valence? Firstly, whether more or less
information is processed can depend on the trade-off between
accuracy and effort goals (e.g., Payne et al., 1996). Research on
positive monetary gambles shows that an accuracy goal may ini-
tiate a processing-intense function, resulting in a preference for
the option with the highest expected value, whereas a minimizing-
effort goal leads to a less processing-intense, lexicographic decision
rule (Payne et al., 1996). The latter may be advantageous, for exam-
ple, when multitasking (Bless et al., 1996). Secondly, appraisals of
uncertainty may be relevant in determining how much processing
effort is expended (Tiedens and Linton, 2001). Emotions asso-
ciated with high certainty (happiness and anger; e.g., Ellsworth
and Scherer, 2003) increase stereotypical information processing
that relies on heuristics and scripts (Forgas, 1992; Bodenhausen
et al., 1994; Forgas and Fiedler, 1996; Tiedens, 2001). In contrast,
low certainty affect is associated with more deliberate information
processing (e.g., Forgas and Fiedler, 1996). Thirdly, the informa-
tion integration process is often based on an ecological rationality,
such that individuals tend to use the process that performs best
in a particular type of environment (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier,
2011). In order to apply this proposition to macro-valence, one
has to define “best performance.”We suggest that a macro-valence
is “better” when it is reliable (e.g., it does not change its value over
time) and valid (e.g., it corresponds to overt behavior, self-report,
etc.). In many cases, this may be a lower effort process (Gigerenzer
and Gaissmaier, 2011), though not necessarily an unconscious
process (e.g., Acker, 2008).
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 261 | 8
Shuman et al. Levels of valence
As recent reviews of dual-process theories show, one can dis-
tinguish processes that rely on working memory from those that
do not (e.g., Evans, 2008). Although the two classes of processes
are often described as, on the one hand, unconscious, fast, and
automatic, and, on the other hand, conscious, slow, and delib-
erative, these features do not necessarily coincide (Moors and De
Houwer, 2006; Evans, 2008; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). For
example, lexicographic strategies are common in conscious and
unconscious processing (Huizenga et al., 2012). As a result, the
question of how many micro-valences are integrated to macro-
valence, and how conscious this process occurs are independent
issues. We will return to the issue of consciousness in the Section
“Implications for Mixed Feelings and Choice.”
As described earlier, a lexicographic and an elimination-by-
aspect strategy require the identification of the most important
micro-valence. This also plays a role for more extensive integration
functions in which micro-valences may be weighted differently
on the basis of their importance (e.g., Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
Some research suggests that specific micro-valences may gener-
ally be more important than others. For example, moral goodness
may generally dominate other micro-valences as suggested by a
study in which choices were facilitated when one of the alterna-
tives was morally better than the other (Hanselmann and Tanner,
2008). However, this study with hypothetical scenarios did not
systematically compare the importance of various micro-valences,
some of which, such as pleasantness, may be more important in
non-hypothetical situations. The prediction that moral goodness
trumps other micro-valences in its influence on macro-valence
therefore requires further research.
Other research suggests that there are systematic individual
differences in the importance of micro-valences. For example,
individuals high in sensation seeking (Zuckerman et al., 1964) or
who value hedonism (Schwartz and Bardi, 2001) may regard pleas-
antness as more important than others, as indicated by research on
sensation seeking and movie enjoyment (Eliashberg and Sawhney,
1994). Systematic “appraisal biases” (Scherer and Brosch, 2009) in
cultures and individuals may reflect differences in the salience or
in the importance of micro-valences. One could therefore predict
that individual and cultural differences are systematically related
to the influence of micro-valences on macro-valence.
Finally, negative and positive evaluations are weighted dif-
ferently. Research on attitudes, impression formation, decision
making,and behavior shows that negative evaluations are weighted
more heavily than positive evaluations (negativity bias; e.g., Miller,
1959; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Cacioppo et al., 1999). Fur-
thermore, low levels of positive stimulus input may lead to more
positive evaluations than low levels of negative stimulus input
lead to negative evaluations (positivity offset; Cacioppo et al.,
1999). Papers on the evaluative space model review in detail the
distinguishable causes, neural and physiological correlates, and
consequences of positive and negative evaluations (Cacioppo and
Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1999). Future research is needed
to systematically examine whether negativity bias and positivity
offset occurs for all micro-valences.
The evaluative space model furthermore suggests that “the
value of separate and multifaceted inputs (is translated) onto com-
mon evaluative (positive, negative) metrics” (Ito and Cacioppo,
2005, pp. 1–2) before “physical limitations constrain behav-
ioral expressions and incline behavioral predispositions toward a
bipolar (good-bad, approach-withdraw) organization” (Cacioppo
et al., 1999, abstract). In other words, all positive and all nega-
tive micro-valences may be integrated separately on positive and
negative dimensions before they combine to macro-valence. This
hypothesis remains to be tested.
The integration of micro-valences to macro-valence may not be
particularly stable. For example, the integration of strongly pos-
itive and negative micro-valences may be unstable because it is
experienced as a conflict, and individuals who appraise this con-
flict, e.g., when in a choice situation that cannot be postponed,
are likely to regulate their state to reduce the conflict (Cacioppo
and Berntson, 1994; van Harreveld et al., 2009). Also, integration
may be difficult in situations involving the trade-off of various
moral goodness evaluations (Hanselmann and Tanner, 2008) or
with particularly complex situations, such as job choices (e.g.,
Luce et al., 1997; Hammond et al., 1998). In the example of a
job choice situation, an impasse may occur in evaluations of the
goal conduciveness associated with the salary of job A and the
self-congruency associated with the departmental fit of job B. Sta-
bility, in this example, may only be achieved over time when new
appraisals become salient (e.g., by adding the pleasantness of the
weather at location A into the decision making), when particular
appraisal results change (e.g., the salary difference between A and
B will not substantially improve one’s standard of living), or when
the integration parameters change (e.g., salary is not as important
as the departmental fit). These mechanisms may be used to reduce
cognitive dissonance (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959).
FROMMACRO-VALENCE AT TIME T TO MICRO-VALENCE AT TIME T + 1
The integration to macro-valence results in a loss of informa-
tion because it reflects a “many-to-one mapping” (Cacioppo and
Berntson, 1994, p. 412; Cacioppo et al., 1999); that is, combina-
tions of micro-valences may predict a particular macro-valence,
but a particular macro-valence corresponds to various micro-
valence combinations. As a result, macro-valence is ambiguous
with regard to the specific combination of underlying micro-
valences. Furthermore, macro-valence may result from factors
other than micro-valences, such as hormones. As such, there is no
clear relation between macro-valence at time t to micro-valences
at time t + 1.
However, individuals may misattribute their experienced gen-
eral affect when making more specific evaluations (Schwarz and
Clore, 1983). As a result, in their everyday life, individuals’ gen-
eral macro-valence may influence more specific micro-valences.
Indeed, in their research on affective experiences in daily life, Kup-
pens et al. (2012) found that core affect valence [operationalized
as (un)pleasantness] influences subsequent appraisals of motive
consistency, coping potential, other agency, and future expectancy.
FROMMICRO-VALENCE AT TIME T TO MICRO-VALENCE AT TIME T + 1
In addition to an influence of micro-valences on macro-valence,
micro-valences also influence subsequent micro-valences (1) by
facilitating the processing of particular appraisal criteria, (2) by
providing constraints on the salience of other appraisal criteria,
and (3) by increasing an appraisal result’s salience.
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First, research on emotion-congruent processing suggests that
information that is congruent with a previous appraisal criterion
may be processed more efficiently. For example, sad individuals
identified words faster and found arguments more persuasive that
were sadness rather than anger congruent (Niedenthal et al., 1997).
However, this research was conducted on the level of emotions and
not appraisals. One hypothesis is that appraisal outcomes facilitate
appraisal-congruent processing in subsequent situations. In the
long run, a tendency to process situations with particular appraisal
criteria may produce an appraisal bias (Scherer and Brosch, 2009).
Second, micro-valences resulting from one appraisal may con-
strain the salience of other appraisals. The CPM (Scherer, 2009)
suggests that appraisal outcomes for some appraisal criteria are
necessary before other appraisal criteria become relevant in a situ-
ation. Indeed, encephalographic and psychophysiological research
suggests that pleasantness, goal conduciveness, and power are
processed in a sequential order (Aue et al., 2007; Lanctôt and
Hess, 2007; Grandjean and Scherer, 2008; Delplanque et al., 2009;
Gentsch et al., submitted). For example, pleasantness is processed
before goal conduciveness (Aue et al., 2007; Lanctôt and Hess,
2007; Grandjean and Scherer, 2008). More research is needed
to understand how these and other appraisals constrain each
other.
Finally, the appraisal tendency framework (Lerner and Keltner,
2000) suggests that appraisal results in one situation may be carried
over to a new situation. For example, Lerner and Keltner (2001)
showed that high control appraisal in one situation lead to the
perception of high control in subsequent, unrelated situations. In
their study, control and power appraisals were not clearly differen-
tiated. A non-linear dynamic systems view suggests an underlying
process for this carry-over effect in which evaluations at time t
stabilize as a result of interactions among system elements; an acti-
vate evaluation can suppress competing evaluations (e.g., Zeeman,
1976).
Other research suggests that when an event ends abruptly, an
opponent process may occur (Solomon and Corbit, 1974). With
an opponent process, an initial evaluation (e.g., positive sensation)
automatically triggers a contrasting evaluation (e.g., negative sen-
sation) that lasts for several minutes or longer, followed by a return
to homeostasis. When the pleasant sensation stops abruptly (e.g.,
interruption of sexual stimulation), the opponent process from the
contrasting evaluation can result in a negative sensation. Similarly,
when a situation appears to be goal obstructive (e.g., worry about
an illness), the abrupt end of the situation (e.g., when a doctor
says one does not have the illness) may not result in a neutral feel-
ing, but in positive affect. Solomon and Corbit (1974) suggest that
the opponent process may become stronger after repeated expe-
riences, explaining the temporal dynamic of affective experiences
ranging from drug addiction to parachute jumping. For exam-
ple, the opponent process model has proven useful in research on
drug addiction (e.g., Koob and Le Moal, 2008) and “addictive”
pro-social behaviors (e.g., Piliavin et al., 1982).
Whether or not a micro-valence is carried over to a new situa-
tion or leads to an opponent process may depend on the ambiguity
of the situation. One hypothesis is that if the new situation is
ambiguous, a micro-valence may be carried over, but if it is not
ambiguous, an opponent process may occur.
FROMMACRO-VALENCE AT TIME T TO MACRO-VALENCE AT TIME
T + 1
As stated earlier, macro-valence is influenced by a variety of fac-
tors. This also includes previous macro-valence. There may be
a homeostasis of macro-valence with individual differences in
reported general negative versus positive affectivity. For example,
neuroticism is characterized by high levels of negative affect and
extraversion by high levels of positive affect (Costa and McCrae,
1980; Rusting and Larsen, 1997). Differences across individu-
als in baseline macro-valence, assessed with measures of well-
being, are partially genetically determined (Lykken and Tellegen,
1996).
Also, context factors may increase the duration of macro-
valences. For example, Wilson and colleagues found that uncer-
tainty amplifies the duration and intensity of affective reactions
to movies (Wilson et al., 2005; Bar-Anan et al., 2009). This effect
does not appear to be driven by increased attention to the emo-
tional event, but by increased engagement with it (Bar-Anan et al.,
2009). Note that it is not clear whether the increased duration and
intensity of mood is driven by specific micro-valences or occurs at
the level of macro-valence.
FROMMICRO-VALENCE AT TIME T TO EMOTIONS AT TIME T + 1
Valence is at the heart of emotional experiences (though valence
is not limited to emotions, but also relevant for, e.g., attitudes
and decision making), and consequentially, the relation of micro-
valences and emotions should be discussed. Emotions are a sub-
group of affect categories,which also include, for example,affective
metaphors. Which category should be considered an “emotion” is
a matter of debate (e.g., is love an emotion? Shaver et al., 1996;
Scherer, 2005). Some categories can be expressed by using an emo-
tion term, particularly those categories reflecting basic or modal
emotions, such as anger, sadness, or joy (Ekman and Friesen, 1976;
Scherer, 2009). Additionally or alternatively to emotion terms,
affect categories may be communicated by natural or culturally
learned spontaneous or enacted postures, gestures, and vocal and
facial expressions. As research on emotions shows, more informa-
tion about the individual and situation than the micro-valences
discussed in this paper may be needed to specify an emotion. As
reviewed earlier, emotions are typically considered multicompo-
nential, including appraisals, action tendencies, subjective feelings,
and physiological changes (e.g., Shuman and Scherer, in press).
On the one hand, there is considerable variability in emotion
terms across ontology, individuals, cultures, and generations (e.g.,
Russell, 1991; Wierzbicka, 1997). Children express anger non-
verbally before they are able to express it verbally. Also, individuals
differ in how closely they monitor their affective state and in how
much detail they express it (Gohm and Clore, 2000). For example,
for some individuals self-reported negative emotions are strongly
correlated, reflecting a more global concern with negative versus
positive feelings, whereas for other individuals self-reported neg-
ative emotions correlate weakly, suggesting a more fine-grained
monitoring of their affective states (Barrett, 2004). Furthermore,
individuals may differ in how many appraisals they associate with
a particular emotion (Kuppens and Tong, 2010). For example,
anger is associated with a norm violation for only some individuals
(Kuppens et al., 2007).
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On the other hand, there are cultural similarities in the
appraisal-emotion relation for many emotion terms (Scherer,
1997; Fontaine et al., in press) and systematic relations between
appraisals and emotions across individuals (e.g., Frijda et al.,
1989). Researchers continue to specify how individual appraisals
relate to specific emotions (e.g., Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Rose-
man et al., 1990; Smith et al., 1993; Scherer, 1997; Kuppens et al.,
2003, 2007; Siemer et al., 2007; Parkinson and Roper, 2009; Tong
et al., 2009).
From recent research on emotions, we conceptualize the
relation between micro-valences and emotions as a non-linear
dynamic system (Zeeman, 1976; Camras, 1992, 2011; Scherer,
2000; Thagard and Nerb, 2002; Lewis, 2005; Izard, 2007). Non-
linear dynamic systems describe how elements of a system interact
and self-organize by nested positive and negative feedback loops.
So-called attractor states in the system reflect stable patterns that
the system elements are drawn to. Affect categories characterized
by affect emotion terms may correspond to such stable patterns.
Micro-valences at time t may be drawn to the stable patterns
reflecting a particular emotion at time t + 1, such as happiness.
Non-linear dynamic systems theory shares many features with
Gestalt theory. Similar to gestalts, “what happens to a part of
the whole is . . . determined by the laws of the inner struc-
ture of its whole,” and “what is happening in the whole cannot
(always) be deduced from the characteristics of the separate pieces”
(Wertheimer, 1944, p. 84). As the elements in a system constrain
themselves over time, the status of one element can change the
status of another element and vice versa. Analyses can focus on
the emergence of the pattern from unstable configurations (path
from micro-valences to emotions; appraisals can then be regarded
as a process that drives the emergence of a particular emotion),
or on the influence of the pattern on subsequent patterns (path
from micro-valences at time t to micro-valences at time t + 1). As
was observed by Wertheimer (1944), p. 87) for gestalts,“something
may be altered in each component part and still the whole remains
identical, or very little may be altered and the whole is completely
changed.”
Non-linear dynamic systems theory may further specify the
relation between parts and wholes, leading to new hypotheses.
For example, Scherer, 2000; see also Sander et al., 2005) pro-
posed, on the basis of a particular non-linear dynamic system, that
with high-power appraisals, small changes in goal conduciveness
appraisals may not change an emotion until a threshold is reached
at which the emotion changes drastically. In contrast, with low-
power appraisals, emotions may change more gradually. Further-
more, in addition to the appraisals elicited by a stimulus, the prior
state of the individual’s appraisals may influence the appraisal-
emotion relation (Scherer, 2000; Sander et al., 2005). With regard
to micro-valences, this leads to the prediction that micro-valences
at time t influence an emotion at time t + 1 depending on the state
of the micro-valences at time t − 1.
The question of temporal dynamics is interesting with regard
to the currently discussed micro-valences, but research on the
question of temporal changes between emotions should prob-
ably go beyond these micro-valences. This is because emotions
are multicomponential, including valenced and non-valenced
appraisals, action tendencies, and other components. The five
valenced appraisals discussed in this paper contribute to emotion
categories, but they are not sufficient to fully describe emotions
and their dynamics. Also, from a non-linear dynamic systems view,
a change in any one emotion component (e.g., appraisal, physio-
logical state, action tendency) could induce the change from one
attractor state to another. For example, physiological changes (e.g.,
drug induced increase in heart rate) may drive changes in emotions
(e.g., from neutral to fear) including the associated appraisals. In
this example, appraisals would be regarded not as the process that
drives the emotion, but as the mental contents associated with the
emotion.
As discussed before, emotion terms are one of many ways to
express an affective state. If systematic relations exist between
underlying components (e.g., micro-valences) and emotion terms,
then similar systematic relations may exist for other affect cate-
gories, such as affective metaphors. For example, one could exam-
ine whether, similar to sadness,“feeling blue” may be related to low
power and moral goodness. Similar to emotion terms, metaphoric
expressions may furthermore be systematically related to other
emotion components (e.g., action tendencies).
MACRO-VALENCE AT TIME T MODERATES THE PATHS FROM
MICRO-VALENCE AT TIME T TO EMOTIONS AND MACRO-VALENCE AT
TIME T + 1
Although macro-valence does not directly influence affect cate-
gories, one’s current level of macro-valence at time t may influence
how micro-valences at time t are integrated to macro-valence or
emotion at time t + 1. For example, research shows that indi-
viduals in a more negative affective state focus more on each
individual evaluation and put more effort into integrating eval-
uations than do those in a less negative state (Luce et al., 1997).
Thus, one would predict that with negative macro-valence at time
t, the integration of micro-valences at time t to macro-valence at
time t + 1 would follow a more effort-intense integration func-
tion. Similarly, a more effortful semantic categorization may lead
to more fine-grained emotion expressions. In contrast, with pos-
itive macro-valence at time t, micro-valences at time t would
be integrated to macro-valence at time t + 1 with a less effort-
intense integration function. Similarly, a less effortful semantic
categorization may lead to less fine-grained emotion expressions.
Another open question is whether the influence of macro-valence
is an effect of one’s general feeling of positivity or negativity that
serves as information about processing requirements (Schwarz and
Clore, 1983) or whether it could be better explained by particular
associated appraisals (e.g., uncertainty; see From Micro-Valences
at Time t to Macro-Valence at Time t + 1).
NO PATH FROM EMOTIONS AT TIME T TO MACRO-VALENCE AT TIME
T + 1
It may seem surprising that we did not include a path from emo-
tions to macro-valence, given the abundant research evidence
showing that emotions are reliably structured along a valence
dimension (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994; Barrett and Russell,
1998; Watson et al., 1999). However, as reviewed earlier, theoretical
analyses show that emotions cannot unambiguously be classified
as positive or negative (Solomon and Stone, 2002; Charland, 2005;
Colombetti, 2005; Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2006; Pfister and Böhm,
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2008). Some researchers have proposed that only specific emo-
tions can be unambiguously mapped to macro-valence (Pfister and
Böhm, 2008). In contrast, we suggest that emotions may become
the object of appraisals, and the appraisal outcomes may deter-
mine the extent to which emotions are experienced as positive or
negative. For example, categorizing one’s own reaction as happi-
ness at a funeral may lead to the micro-valence of moral badness
and – depending on the importance given to moral badness relative
to other appraisals in this situation – to negative macro-valence.
In many situations, though, happiness is associated with positive
micro-valences. As a result of previous experiences or cultural
knowledge, there is a high overall likelihood that happiness is pos-
itive (the affective quality of happiness is positive; Russell, 2003).
Consequently, emotions may be reliably identified as positive or
negative, for example, in rating tasks, reflecting the knowledge
about their affective quality rather than current macro-valence.
We propose to replace the old question, “are specific emo-
tions positive or negative?” with the new question, “why is it
that people say that an emotion is negative or positive?” Why is
fear typically considered a negative emotion although it may be
useful to avoid danger? Why is anger typically considered a neg-
ative emotion although “the arousal (e.g., feeling strong) may be
experienced as pleasurable, and the consequences of expressing
one’s anger (putting the other person in his place) may be quite
enjoyable” (Pfister and Böhm, 2008, p. 7)? What is the under-
lying mechanism? What are the underlying micro-valences, and
which integration rule links them to a particular macro-valence?
Some suggest that a single micro-valence, e.g., the pleasantness of
having the emotion, is not sufficient to understand why an emo-
tion is seen as positive or negative (Deonna and Teroni, 2012),
but more research is needed to understand the evaluation of
emotions.
Identifying the link between appraisals and affective quality
may also help to explain cross-cultural differences in evaluating
emotions as more or less positive or negative. For example, John-
son et al. (1986) report that anger is a more negative emotion
for the Machiguenga from southeastern Peru than for other cul-
tures and explain the cultural differences by observing that anger
is regarded as particularly disruptive of the social peace in this
culture. This suggests that the moral badness of anger is more
salient or weighted more heavily in this culture than in other
cultures. However, direct studies of appraisals and emotions are
needed to further examine the question of cultural differences in
the evaluations of emotion and related micro-valences.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MIXED FEELINGS AND CHOICE
The framework suggested here incorporates the explanatory power
of previous multifaceted and one-dimensional conceptualiza-
tions of valence. Similar to previous research on valence as the
common currency, we construe one-dimensional macro-valence
as a primary predictor for choice. As in appraisal theory (e.g.,
Scherer, 2001), we suggest that multifaceted valences can result
in mixed feelings, and conflicts can arise either between levels of
processing (e.g., a conflict between internalized and deliberately
endorsed gender roles for the ought self) or between different
micro-valences (e.g., a conflict between pleasantness and goal
conduciveness appraisals).
Furthermore, a framework that conceptualizes valence at two
levels suggests that conflict can result from consciously inte-
grated micro-valences that do not correspond to one’s unconscious
macro-valence. In other words, one’s reasoning about a situation
does not correspond to one’s gut feeling about it. The source
of a discrepant unconscious macro-valence may lie, firstly, in a
different integration of micro-valences at the unconscious level.
For example, a girl may appraise having a romantic partner as
not particularly pleasurable, but congruent with her self-concept
and morally desirable. Unconsciously, the low pleasantness micro-
valence may be most important in determining her macro-valence,
but consciously, the girl may be reluctant to justify her relationship
status based on this presumably superficial criterion. She may then
experience a conflict between the unconscious and the conscious
macro-valence regarding this partner. This conflict may be evident,
for example, in non-verbally avoiding and verbally approaching
the partner. Research on implicit and explicit attitudes and motives
is relevant to understand this type of conflict. This research sug-
gests that individuals may simultaneously hold unconscious and
conscious attitudes (e.g., Wilson et al., 2000). Secondly, conflicts
between conscious and unconscious macro-valence may result
from other influences on unconscious macro-valence that are
more powerful than micro-valences. For example, hormones may
influence macro-valence more strongly than micro-valences. Reg-
ulating persistent conflicts between conscious and unconscious
macro-valence may consume volitional strength, which may lower
well-being in the long run, as suggested by research on implicit and
explicit motive discrepancies (Kehr, 2004).
Discrepancies of conscious and unconscious macro-valence
may furthermore influence the quality of one’s choices. To stick
with the example of the girl with an unpleasant partner, she
may consciously tally the number of positive micro-valences but
unconsciously apply a one-clever-cue heuristic. A conscious choice
would be to remain with the partner, but an unconscious choice
using her pleasantness appraisals as one-clever-cue would be to
break up with him. Choices may reflect the conscious evaluation
when cognitive resources are sufficiently high to retrieve it and
when it is stronger than an unconscious evaluation of the same
situation (Wilson et al., 2000). It depends on the particular situ-
ation which process yields a better outcome (e.g., Gigerenzer and
Gaissmaier, 2011; Huizenga et al., 2012).
To summarize, by incorporating one-dimensional and mul-
tifaceted conceptions of valence, the current framework can take
advantage of existing explanations for choice and mixed emotions.
Furthermore, we propose additional pathways that lead to mixed
emotions and to suboptimal choice.
CONCLUSION
Despite the popularity of the valence concept, valence is differently
defined in previous research as multifaceted (e.g., Scherer, 2010) or
one-dimensional (e.g., Cabanac, 1992), and its application in affec-
tive science has repeatedly been criticized (Solomon and Stone,
2002; Colombetti, 2005). Rather than making a case for either mul-
tifaceted or one-dimensional valence alone, we suggested that they
both have advantages and disadvantages and should be integrated.
Here, we propose a new framework that distinguishes between two
fundamental meanings of valence. With micro-valence, we refer
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to valenced appraisal outputs (pleasantness, goal conduciveness,
power, self-congruence, moral goodness). In any situation, multi-
ple appraisals may coexist, resulting in a multifaceted, potentially
mixed positive-negative affective experience and influencing the
nature of specific behavioral tendencies. Co-occurring with micro-
valence, macro-valence is one-dimensional and predicts choice.
Finally, for communication, affect categories may simultaneously
exist, such as emotions. Multiple relations exist between micro-
and macro-valence and affect categories across time.
Similarities to and differences from previous models of valence
can be noted. First, similar to our framework, the evaluative
space model (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo et al.,
1997, 1999) and a three-level hierarchical model by Tellegen et al.
(1999) emphasize the relation between underlying evaluations and
macro-valence. These models focus on positive versus negative
evaluations, whereas we distinguish qualitatively different micro-
valences. Thus, our approach complements these models. Tellegen
et al. (1999) describe the dimensional and hierarchical structure
of affect, including affect categories, bivariate, and bipolar valence,
derived from studies on affect ratings, whereas the evaluative space
model discusses the processes underlying the integration of bivari-
ate evaluations to bipolar evaluations. We add to this literature
by discussing the temporal relation between valences at differ-
ent levels and affect categories. In our framework, micro-valences,
macro-valence, and emotion occur simultaneously. Furthermore,
micro- and macro-valence influence each other across time. The
dynamic between micro- and macro-valence can be described as
a non-linear dynamic system. Non-linear dynamic systems are
increasingly used to describe emotion experience, development,
encoding, and decoding (e.g., Zeeman, 1976; Fogel and Thelen,
1987; Wolff, 1987; Camras, 1992, 2011; Thagard and Nerb, 2002;
Lewis, 2005; Izard, 2007; Sacharin et al., 2012).
Second, our approach is also compatible with the Gestalt
approach to emotions. For example, Castelfranchi and Miceli
(2009) describe cognitive-motivational compounds of emotional
experience as gestalts emerging from beliefs, evaluative beliefs, and
desires. However, these authors focus on differentiating emotions
in an approach reminiscent of Wierzbicka’s (1999) emotion scripts,
in contrast to the focus of our framework on valence.
Third, our framework complements the framework for study-
ing the neurobiology of value-based decision making by Rangel
et al. (2008). The authors describe the steps in a decision-making
process as the representation of a situation, valuation, action selec-
tion, outcome evaluation, and learning. The levels of valence
discussed in our framework seem to be mostly relevant for the
outcome evaluation. As Rangel et al. note (p. 8), “much remains
to be understood about the outcome-valuation system. What net-
work is responsible for computing positive and negative outcome
values in different types of domains? How are positive and nega-
tive outcome-valuation signals integrated?” Distinguishing micro-
valences on the basis of appraisals and examining their relation to
macro-valence may be a starting point to examine this question.
The micro-valences discussed in this paper may additionally
be systematically related to the valuation step in the decision-
making process described by Rangel et al. (2008), e.g., to compute
how pleasant or how goal conducive a situation is. To predict the
value of a course of action, the authors distinguish three systems.
With the Pavlovian system, value is assigned by evolution, with
the habitual system by repeated stimulus-response associations
and trial-and-error, and with the goal-directed system by com-
putations of action-outcome associations. Possibly, specific value
systems are more closely related to certain appraisals, such as
pleasantness to the Pavlovian system, goal conduciveness to the
goal-directed system, and self-congruency to the habitual system.
Thus, Rangel et al.’s model complements the current framework
because it can describe in great detail how the initial assessment
of pleasantness, goal conduciveness, etc. comes about before dif-
ferent evaluations are integrated to guide choice, behavior, and
communication as described in the current framework.
Finally, our suggestion that both a “common currency” and
qualitatively different types of valence exist is highly consistent
with recent neuroimaging research. The striatum, ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, and orbitofrontal cortex have repeatedly been
suggested as areas that code various types of valence (e.g., Shiz-
gal and Conover, 1996; Schultz, 2000; Montague and Berns, 2002;
Berridge, 2003; Saxe and Haushofer, 2008; Chib et al., 2009). At
the same time, different types of valence have distinct neural cor-
relates (e.g., Sescousse et al., 2010). For example, in addition to
neural correlates of the subjective value across types of rewards
in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the striatum, Levy and
Glimcher (2011) identified distinct neural correlates of the sub-
jective value of food rewards in the hypothalamus and of money
rewards in the posterior cingulated cortex. While these authors
focus on the qualitative differences in the reward value of differ-
ent objects (food, money), however, we focus on the qualitative
difference between perspectives with which the same object may
be approached (e.g., pleasantness or goal conduciveness of food).
In future research, one may want to manipulate the perspective
with which objects, e.g., food, are approached, to more directly
examine the neural correlates of the micro-valences discussed in
the current paper.
Instead of debating the value of one-dimensional valence
(Solomon and Stone, 2002; Colombetti, 2005) and whether one-
dimensional valence or emotion is the more powerful concept
to explain affective behavior (Barrett et al., 2007a; Izard, 2007;
Panksepp, 2008), we suggest that researchers should focus on
the relations between micro- and macro-valence and affect cat-
egories (e.g., emotions). For some of these relations, knowledge
has already accumulated, in particular regarding the relation of
micro-valences to emotions. For most paths, however, new and
yet-to-be-tested hypotheses were derived.
The framework applies to more or less “emotional” evalua-
tions; that is, the difference between cognition and emotion is
purposefully underemphasized. Research on emotions, but also
on emotion and cognition, as well as on behavioral economics, is
relevant to the current framework, the latter particularly for the
relation of micro-valences to macro-valence.
The confounding of affective and cognitive processes is an
important difference between our model and Russell’s psycho-
logical constructionist model, which distinguishes between “cold”
perceptual processes (affective quality) and “hot” core affect. In
the psychological constructionist model, a lack of improvement
of a depressed patient’s mood by viewing a pleasant sunset is
used as a good example for the independence of an affective state
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(depression) from a cognitive perception (of the sunset; Russell,
2003). Also, the nature of mixed feelings is reduced to cognitive
perceptions of affective quality. In contrast, in our framework,
there is no problem to account for the occurrence of mixed feel-
ings as well as mixed cognitions. This is more compatible with the
current evidence on mixed feelings reviewed above. Furthermore,
on the basis of our framework, we would explain the example
of the depressed patient by referring to different appraisals rather
than to“hot”and“cold”processes. Specifically, low goal conducive-
ness (depression) may not be ameliorated by a pleasant experience
(sunset). This explanation fits better with the existing evidence that
anhedonic individuals do not differ in their reported pleasure from
consummatory behaviors (e.g., eating dinner), but report reduced
anticipatory pleasure regarding goal-directed activities (e.g., mak-
ing dinner; Gard et al., 2007). Indeed, affect regulation may be
most powerful when targeting the appraisal that needs regulating,
in the example, goal conduciveness. Further research is needed to
examine these explanations.
A possible extension of the model that is to include a path
from emotions at time t to emotions at time t + 1. For example, it
has been suggested that language influences which affective states
are recognized by shaping category learning and application (Bar-
rett et al., 2007b). A particular category may become more salient
based on the recent usage of this category, similar to a general
priming effect (Carroll and Young, 2005). However, satiating the
semantic meaning of a word by repeated exposure (e.g., 30 times)
reduces categorization abilities for this term for affective stimuli
(Lindquist et al., 2006). While this path adds to the completeness
of the framework as depicted in Figure 2, it is not directly relevant
to the discussion of valence.
Another possible extension of the framework is to include addi-
tional micro-valences. We examined only a limited number of
appraisals derived from the CPM (Scherer, 1984, 2009). Future
research may examine the affective experiences associated with
other appraisals. With the appraisals examined in this paper, we
implicitly assumed a linear increase in positivity (negativity) for
each appraisal. For example, the more a situation is in line with
the ideal self, the more moral goodness may be experienced. How-
ever, we can speculate that both low and high certainty may be
aversive, but that medium levels of certainty may be positive. Also,
the valence of certainty may be moderated by other appraisals.
For example, low certainty about otherwise positive events may
be experienced as positive, but low certainty about negative events
may be particularly troubling (Bar-Anan et al., 2009).
We hope to have shown that although there is much about
valence that we do not yet understand it can be investigated more
accurately by adopting a new integrative framework. Given the
problems with a one-dimensional view on valence, it has previ-
ously been suggested to “move beyond” (Zeelenberg and Pieters,
2006, p. 119) or to “abandon” (Solomon and Stone, 2002, p. 432)
valence. On the contrary, we believe that valence has a promising
future if investigated at its different levels.
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